MANILA - After nearly a year of intense bilateral negotiations, the
Philippines and United States have overcome previous stumbling blocks and
reached a "consensus" on the contours of a new defense pact. Formal
finalization of the deal is expected to coincide with US President Barack
Obama's scheduled official visit to the Philippines in late April.
After a series of failed diplomatic overtures towards China, Philippine
President Benigno Aquino has now placed strategic hope in revitalized and
bolstered military ties with the US, a move aimed in part at
counterbalancing China's rising assertiveness over contested territories in the
South China Sea.
Alarmed by China's recent reported incursions
into Philippine-controlled maritime territories, including this month's
blockade of Philippine ships from accessing the Second Thomas Shoal, Aquino
recently recalibrated his government's negotiating position to allow for a
stronger, more permanent US presence on Philippine soil.
Since 2002, as part of Washington's so-called global "war on terror", approximately 500 American troops from the US's Special Operations Command Pacific have been stationed on a rotational basis on the southern Philippine island of Mindanao.
US troops have provided logistical, technical, and, according to certain reports, combat assistance to the Armed Forces of the Philippines in their fight against the al-Qaeda-affiliated Abu Sayyaf insurgent group and other extremist groups with bases in the southern Philippines.
Since 2002, as part of Washington's so-called global "war on terror", approximately 500 American troops from the US's Special Operations Command Pacific have been stationed on a rotational basis on the southern Philippine island of Mindanao.
US troops have provided logistical, technical, and, according to certain reports, combat assistance to the Armed Forces of the Philippines in their fight against the al-Qaeda-affiliated Abu Sayyaf insurgent group and other extremist groups with bases in the southern Philippines.
Signaling a more external orientation, the Philippines recently revised the
title of the proposed new bilateral defense pact from an agreement on an
"Increased Rotational Presence" to one known as "Enhanced
Defense Cooperation" (AEDC). While recent Philippine-US military cooperation
has focused on domestic threats, the new pact's unspoken aim will be to enhance
Manila's deterrent capacities vis-a-vis China in contested maritime
areas.
According to an exclusive report by the local Manila Bulletin, the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) in late February sacked one of the top
members of the Philippine negotiating panel, Foreign Affairs Assistant
Secretary Carlos King Soreta. The cause: his apparent insistence on clear-cut
clarification of provisions on the control over and access to temporary US
facilities to be established within Philippine military camps under the new
agreement.
Disagreement over those provisions bogged down the first four rounds of the
negotiations. Soreta - who reportedly had heated discussions with his superiors
and formerly headed the American Affairs division of the DFA - was demoted to
overseeing the Foreign Service Institute. Once Soreta was sidelined the
negotiations accelerated, according to sources familiar with the
situation.
By mid-March, Filipino officials declared that prior concerns over access
to military facilities were "sufficiently addressed" and that a round
of talks in late March will iron out final details. Philippine Defense
Undersecretary Pio Lorenzo Batino recently said it was "safe to say there
is already consensus" on the issue of how Philippine and US troops will
share military facilities. Philippine officials have also said that both sides
have agreed that any US-built military facilities would be for joint use, and
that there will be no exclusively US-controlled areas within Philippine
bases.
There have been no verified reports of the exact details of the facilities
to be built by the US under the pact, nor has Manila indicated the precise
nature of the assistance it seeks from Washington. Strategic analysts contend
that the Philippines is pushing hard for leasing advanced American naval
hardware geared towards countering, among other things, Chinese paramilitary
vessels now patrolling contested features in the South China Sea.
According to the Philippine Department of National Defense, "The
proposed agreement will allow the sharing of defined areas within certain AFP
[Armed Forces of the Philippines] facilities with elements of the US military
on a rotational basis within parameters consistent with the Philippine
Constitution and laws."
Tempering expectations of a rapid deployment of American troops on
Philippine soil and naval assets in contested waters, Batino said that the
ongoing negotiations were still "very fluid and we [Philippine government
and their US counterparts] cannot have a definitive time line when we will
finish this". US Ambassador to the Philippines Philip Goldberg, meanwhile,
has committed to "conclude the agreement as soon as we can", saying that
both sides still need to work out "some details".
Stumbling blocks
The Philippine government's perceived ambivalence towards certain
sovereignty-related details of the agreement has raised hackles in certain
nationalistic quarters. A number of prominent legislators have voiced their
concerns about the "legality" of the proposed pact given
constitutional restrictions on the establishment of permanent foreign military
bases on Philippine soil.
Aquino's administration has insisted that the pact under negotiation falls within
already existing treaties between the Philippines and the US, specifically the
1951 Mutual Defense Treaty and the 1997 Visiting Forces Agreement, and thus
there is no need for Senate ratification of the proposed AEDC. Leading
legislators have countered that the proposed pact requires legislative
oversight and separate approval to ensure it is consistent with Philippine laws
and national interests.
Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, one of the country's most respected
public figures, has been a major critic of the proposed agreement, arguing that
allowing foreign troops and hardware on Philippine soil "is a major
subject in itself" which does "not [constitute] a minor case of
detail" that supposedly falls under the provisions of prior bilateral
treaties, as the Aquino administration has maintained.
News reports suggest that the US is also looking beyond an executive
agreement, which Washington apparently fears could be reversed upon the
expiration of Aquino's term and election of a new president in 2016. Local
analysts contend that the next Philippine government, potentially headed by a
pragmatist like incumbent Vice President Jejomar Binay, will look to
recalibrate Manila's position vis-?-vis China to avoid conflict and maximize
bilateral economic ties.
The Philippines and US have apparently yet to agree on exactly what kind of
military hardware, surveillance equipment and naval assets will be shared with
Filipino troops to defend Manila's claims in the South China Sea. Invoking the
two sides' 1951 mutual defense treaty, Manila has sought concrete US military
and strategic support to counter Chinese maritime assertiveness.
However, the Obama administration has so far been reluctant to become
directly involved in a potential confrontation between the Philippines and
China. Washington's priority has been to use diplomatic pressure and a larger
strategic footprint in Asia to deter further Chinese territorial assertiveness,
without necessarily risking a military conflict with China.
At the same time, the disputed region is becoming more militarized. During
the recently-concluded National People's Congress meeting, China announced its
plans to further accelerate its military spending (from 10.7% of gross
domestic product in 2013 to 12.2% in 2014), with a special focus on
enhancing the country's maritime power. The larger budget outlays come in light
of intensifying territorial disputes in the Western Pacific and the US's policy
to "pivot" 60% of its global naval assets to the Asia-Pacific by
2020.
Concerted effort
Against the backdrop of projected US military budget cuts, Katrina
McFarland, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, recently said:
"Right now, the [US pivot policy] is being looked at again because
candidly it can't happen."
Aware of the US's fiscal woes and the Pentagon's struggle to build a
"leaner but meaner" armed forces through greater use of technology,
Japan, the Philippines and Vietnam, countries similarly locked in bitter
territorial disputes with China, are stepping up their strategic
cooperation.
Allies in the region are still confident that the US will remain as the
primary naval power in the Pacific for decades to come, and that the Pentagon's
budget woes will increasingly encourage a more efficient and innovative
allocation of dwindling resources.
But there is also a creeping realization among US allies that enhanced
self-reliance and intra-regional cooperation is crucial to shoring up their
national defenses. Rather than advocating greater dependence on Washington, as
the new pact with Manila seems to insinuate, the Obama administration has
encouraged its regional allies to develop stronger military-to-military
ties.
Japan is increasingly at the center of that China-containing strategic
diversification. Vietnamese President Truong Tan Sang visited Japan earlier
this month, following up Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's visit to Hanoi
soon after assuming power in 2013. During Sang's visit, the two sides enhanced
their existing strategic partnership to a so-called "Extensive Strategic
Partnership for Peace and Prosperity in Asia".
The new deal includes provisions for greater armed forces cooperation and
allowances for more mutual visits of military ships. Japan also offered as part
of the enhanced partnership to assist Hanoi in upgrading the capacity of its
currently weak maritime law enforcement agencies.
Vietnam and the Philippines will be among the potential biggest
beneficiaries of the Abe administration's attempts to revive Japan as a
"normal power" (with offensive military capabilities) and rally the
region to jointly counterbalance China under Abe's so-called "security
diamond" concept.
In recent months, Japan has stepped up its military spending, implemented
measures to better protect its maritime borders with China, and announced it
would consider exporting advanced armaments to regional partners which could be
deployed to assist in the protection of vital sea lanes in the Western
Pacific.
Although Tokyo has not indicated what weapons it might provide, strategic
analysts believe that regional allies desire access to Japan-manufactured
Soryu-class submarines and multi-role response vessels to bolster their
maritime defenses against China.
Vietnam has also stepped up its strategic engagement with the Philippines, as both sides explore institutionalized cooperation on the South China Sea disputes. In particular, the two sides have been coordinating their diplomatic position with respect to their disputes with China. Philippine officials hope that Vietnam and Japan will soon join Manila in legally challenging China's sweeping maritime claims at relevant international bodies.
Vietnam has also stepped up its strategic engagement with the Philippines, as both sides explore institutionalized cooperation on the South China Sea disputes. In particular, the two sides have been coordinating their diplomatic position with respect to their disputes with China. Philippine officials hope that Vietnam and Japan will soon join Manila in legally challenging China's sweeping maritime claims at relevant international bodies.
It is increasingly clear that Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam are
strengthening their strategic cooperation while at the same time encouraging
deeper American commitment to hedge against China's rising assertiveness in
contested maritime areas. It is unclear, however, whether those efforts will
pressure China to soften or harden its territorial claims and geopolitical
ambitions.
[i] Theo Asia Times Online, see at: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/SEA-02-270314.html
(Mar 27, 2014).
[ii] Xem
bảng dịch của Trần Quang tại http://nghiencuubiendong.vn/tin-ncbd/4042-nhung-moi-quan-he-moi-o-bien-dong.
[iii] Richard Javad Heydarian is a Manila-based foreign affairs analyst
focusing on the South China Sea and international security issues. He is a
lecturer at Ateneo De Manila University's Department of Political Science, and
the author of the upcoming book How Capitalism Failed the Arab World: The Economic Roots and the
Precarious Future of the Middle East Uprisings. He can be reached at
jrheydarian@gmail.com.
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